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I. Introduction
The revelations about the National Security Agency’s
surveillance programs have raised significant questions about how
government agencies handle sensitive information gathered
∗ Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, Pepperdine University; CoFounder of AirMap. This Essay is adapted from Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and
Aerial Surveillance, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498116.
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through surveillance techniques and other electronic means. As
drones become an important tool used by the government,
questions will arise about how government agencies store and
protect information gathered by drones. This Essay outlines key
data retention considerations that government operators of drones
should examine.
This Essay makes three key points. First, to address the
possibility that drones and other sophisticated aerial surveillance
technology will allow the government to build a comprehensive
picture of an entire community’s daily movements (a different
persistent surveillance harm), governments should enact laws
mandating data retention procedures that require heightened
levels of suspicion and increased procedural protections for
accessing stored data gathered by aerial surveillance, coupled with
a requirement that data be deleted after a legislatively-mandated
period of time.
Second, governments should impose enhanced transparency
and accountability measures, requiring agencies to publish on a
regular basis information about the use of aerial surveillance
devices—both manned and unmanned—and should consider
creating local oversight boards to police the use of surveillance
technologies.
Third, legal reformers should recognize that technology such
as auto-redaction may make aerial surveillance by drones more
protective of privacy than human surveillance.
II. Background on Drones
On the Sunday of President’s Day weekend, 2015, Secretary of
Transportation Anthony Foxx and FAA Administrator Michael
Huerta convened a hastily arranged public conference call to
announce pending regulations that would allow for the integration
of drones into the national airspace. The regulations are historic;
for the first time in American history, aircraft operating without
onboard pilots would have a regulatory regime to govern their use.
Sunday of a holiday weekend was an odd time to announce the
most significant aviation-related regulations since the creation of
the FAA, but the agency’s hand was forced. A little more than
twenty-four hours before the conference call, I wrote a column for
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Forbes that revealed the details of the pending regulations—the
Associated Press and the Wall Street Journal credited the column
with first reporting the news that forced the FAA to announce their
regulations. 1
The use of drones for surveillance has to date been a sparsely
discussed topic in legal scholarship; the FAA’s proposed changes to
federal law, however, make it all but certain that drones will be a
catalyst for new ways of thinking about privacy and surveillance. 2
This Essay seeks to frame future discussions about how state and
local governments will handle the privacy issues associated with
aerial surveillance by proposing innovative reforms that move
beyond the call for requiring warrants for the use of drones.
The FAA’s proposed rule is just the start of a new era in
aviation, as it is estimated that 30,000 drones will be flying in the
1. See Gregory S. McNeal, Leaked FAA Document Provides Glimpse Into
Drone Regulations, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
gregorymcneal/2015/02/14/the-faa-may-get-drones-right-after-all-9-insights-intoforthcoming-regulations/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (noting “AP and The Wall
Street Journal credited this post with first reporting the story about the
regulations, which are now out for public comment”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Jack Nicas, Federal Document Sheds Light on Proposed
Drone Rules, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/onlinedocument-sheds-light-on-proposed-drone-rules-1423960620 (last visited June 23,
2015) (acknowledging that the impending regulations were first reported by
Forbes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Joan Lowy, FAA
Seeking Drone Rules Favorable to Commercial Operators, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb.
14, 2015), http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/f70471f764144b2fab526d39972
d37b3/Article_2015-02-14-US--FAA-Drones/id-381ad5339b3348d984da077c86a2
2b25 (last visited June 23, 2015) (noting that the story was first reported by
Forbes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Technically known as unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned aircraft
systems, this Essay will refer to these devices by their colloquial name—drones.
For some of the prescient articles discussing drones or surveillance issues that
might touch on drones, see generally M. Ryan Calo, The Drone As Privacy
Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2011); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The
Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); Margot E. Kaminski,
Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV.
CIRCUIT 57 (2013); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155
(2015); Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need
for State Legislation, HARV. J. LEGIS. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492374; Andrew B. Talai, Drones and Jones: The
Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CAL. L. REV. 729
(2014); Wells C. Bennett, Civilian Drones, Privacy, and the Federal-State Balance,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/09/
civilian-drones-and-privacy (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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national airspace (NAS) by the end of the decade. 3 But even more
drones are coming. According to the FAA, “[O]nce the entire
integration process is complete, the FAA envisions the NAS
populated with UAS that operate well beyond the operational
limits proposed in [the rule announced on February 15, 2015.]” 4
Drones will be a catalyst for new ways of thinking about
privacy and surveillance, but contrary to the hopes of many
advocates, the issue of privacy was not addressed in the FAA’s
proposed rules. 5 Rather, the FAA explicitly stated that matters
related to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties were beyond the
3. The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy
Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2
(2013) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
4. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, at 34
(proposed Feb. 15, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101,
107 & 183) [hereinafter NPRM],
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
rulemaking/recently_published/media/2120-AJ60_NPRM_2-152015_joint_signature.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Patrice Hendriksen, Unmanned and Unchecked: Confronting
the Unmanned Aircraft System Privacy Threat Through Interagency
Coordination, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 207, 212 (2013) (proposing FAA involvement
in an interagency process among UAS federal stakeholders to address privacy);
Kellan Howell, Invasion: 7,500 Drones in U.S. Airspace Within 5 Years, FAA
Warns, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/
nov/7/faa-chief-announces-progress-drone-regs/?page=all (last visited June 23,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Keith Lain, Markey:
Privacy Before Drone Deliveries, HILL (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:53 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/191722-markey-protect-privacy-beforedrone-deliveries (last visited June 23, 2015) (“Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) said
privacy protections need to be in place before Amazon starts delivering packages
with drones.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Matthew J.
Schwartz, FAA Promises Privacy Standards For Domestic Drones, DARK READING
(Feb. 15, 2013, 11:39 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/faapromises-privacy-standards-for-domestic-drones/d/d-id/1108691? (last visited
June 23, 2015) (“The Federal Aviation Administration Thursday announced that
it will publicly develop privacy policies to cover the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), more often referred to as drones, in U.S. airspace.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jay Stanley, New Eyes in the Sky:
Protecting Privacy from Domestic Drone Surveillance, ACLU (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/new-eyes-skyprotecting-privacy-domestic-drone (last visited June 23, 2015) (“In the report, we
discuss the current drone landscape (technology and use), talk about the privacy
issues, and conclude with recommendations for protections we believe must be
put in place to ensure they don’t destroy our privacy.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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scope of their rulemaking. 6 Instead, President Obama directed
that those privacy issues related to the federal government’s use of
drones would be handled according to terms outlined in a
Presidential Memorandum, while the issues raised by private uses
of drones would be addressed through rules that will be created in
a
multi-stakeholder
process
led
by
the
National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a
subordinate agency of the Department of Commerce. 7
III. The President’s Order Regarding Federal Government Drone
Operations
The federal government has taken very little action with
regard to data retention procedures for drones. Rather than
directing the FAA to promulgate regulations to address privacy,
the President instead issued an executive order, styled as an
executive memorandum. 8 That memorandum directed the federal
6. NPRM, supra note 4, at 36.
7. Id.; see Gregory S. McNeal, What You Need To Know About The Federal
(Feb.
15,
2015),
Government’s
Drone
Privacy
Rules,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-comingheres-what-president-obama-thinks-about-privacy/ (last visited June 23, 2015)
(“The President
directed
the Department
of
Commerce’s,
National
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA) to initiate a process
for creating privacy, accountability and transparency rules for commercial and
private uses of drones.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Presidential Memorandum, Promoting Economic Competitiveness While
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, WHITE HOUSE, § 2(b) (Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
Drone Privacy Memo] https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/
presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua
(last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (“Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the
Department of Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, and in consultation with other interested agencies,
will initiate this multi-stakeholder engagement process . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. On the subtle differences between an Executive Order and other forms
of executive action such as presidential memoranda, see John Contrubis,
Executive Orders and Proclamations, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS No. 95-722A (1999)
Both are undefined, written instruments by which the President
directs, and governs actions by, Government officials and agencies.
They differ in that executive orders must be published in the Federal
Register whereas presidential memoranda are similarly published only
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government to create standards for how the federal government
will address the privacy issues associated with drones. 9 Under the
Order, federal government agencies and some recipients of federal
funds will have one year to implement the President’s policies and
make them publicly available. 10
The President’s memorandum acknowledges that drones “may
play a transformative role in fields as diverse as urban
infrastructure management, farming, public safety . . . and
disaster response.” 11 The Order acknowledges that drones are a
lower-cost alternative to manned aircraft and can reduce risks to
human life. 12 The President’s directive takes account of “the
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns these systems may
raise.” 13 The memorandum segments federal government drone
operations from privately operated drones and leaves the matter
of state and locally operated drones—except those purchased with
federal funds—to be addressed by the states. 14
The President’s order requires agencies to implement the
guidelines below and inform the public about how to access their
policies by February 15, 2016. 15 The memorandum requires federal
agencies to examine their drone policies prior to the adoption of
new drone technology and at least every three years thereafter. 16
if the President determines that they have “general applicability and
legal effect.”
9. See Drone Privacy Memo, supra note 7 (establishing “transparent
principles that govern the Federal Government’s use of UAS in the NAS, and to
promote the responsible use of this technology in the private and commercial
sectors”).
10. See id. § 1(e) (“Within 1 year of the date of this memorandum, agencies
shall publish information on how to access their publicly available policies and
procedures implementing this section.”).
11. Id.
12. See id. (“As compared to manned aircraft, UAS may provide lower-cost
operation and augment existing capabilities while reducing risks to human
life.”).
13. Id.
14. See id. § 1(c) (“[R]equire that State, local, tribal, and territorial
government recipients of Federal grant funding for the purchase or use of UAS
for their own operations have in place policies and procedures to safeguard
individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such
funds.”).
15. Id. § 1(e).
16. See id. § 1(a) (“Accordingly, agencies shall, prior to deployment of new
UAS technology and at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS policies
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The memorandum notes that drones must only be used in a
manner consistent “with the Constitution, federal law, and other
applicable regulations and policies.” 17 It also reaffirms that
individuals have the right to seek access to, and amendment of,
records associated with drone usage. 18
The President’s memorandum also creates new requirements
for the collection of information by drones and requires that
agencies only collect information “to the extent that such collection
or use is consistent with and relevant to an authorized purpose.” 19
Information collected by drones that is not maintained in a system
of records covered by the Privacy Act shall not be disseminated
outside the agency, unless dissemination is required by law or
fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with agency
requirements. 20 If information collected using drones contains
personally identifiable information (PII), that information
shall not be retained for more than 180 days unless the
retention is determined to be necessary to an authorized
mission of the retaining agency, is maintained in a system of
records covered by the Privacy Act, or is required to be retained
for a longer period by any other applicable law or regulation. 21

To address civil liberties, the memorandum mostly references
existing laws. Specifically, it calls on agencies to ensure that they
have policies to “prohibit the collection, use, retention, or
dissemination of data in any manner that would violate the First
Amendment” or would illegally discriminate based on protected
categories like ethnicity, race, gender, etc. 22 It also mandates that
drone-related activities are “performed in a manner consistent
and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of
information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties are protected.”).
17. Id. § 1.
18. See id. (“[A]nd permits individuals to seek access to and amendment of
records.”).
19. Id. § 1(a)(ii).
20. See id. § 1(a)(iii) (“UAS-collected information that is not maintained in
a system of records covered by the Privacy Act shall not be disseminated outside
of the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized
purpose and complies with agency requirements.”).
21. Id. § 1(a)(ii).
22. Id. § 1(b)(i).
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with the Constitution and applicable laws, Executive Orders, and
other Presidential directives.” 23 The memorandum requires
agencies to ensure that they have in place a means to “receive,
investigate, and address, as appropriate, privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties complaints.” 24
Oversight and accountability of Federal drone operations will
require creation of new procedures or modification of existing
procedures. 25 Agencies will be required to ensure that their
oversight procedures “including audits or assessments, comply
with existing policies and regulations.” 26 Federal government
personnel and contractors who work on drone programs will
require rules of conduct and training, and procedures will need to
be implemented for reporting suspected cases of misuse or abuse
of drone technologies. 27
In a passage particularly relevant to this Essay, the
memorandum addresses the matter of drones shared with state
and local governments, drones purchased with federal funds, and
information gathered by drones that are shared with others. The
memorandum directs that such operations must comply with the
Executive Order and applicable laws and regulations. 28 If agencies
authorize the use of drones in response to requests from federal,
state, local, tribal, or territorial government operations, it will
need to be conducted pursuant to established policies and
procedures. 29 Also, state, local, tribal, or territorial government
recipients of federal grant funding for the purchase or use of drones
will need to have in place policies and procedures to safeguard
23. Id. § 1(b)(ii).
24. Id. § 1(b)(iii).
25. See id. § 1(a) (“Agencies shall update their policies and procedures, or
issue new policies and procedures, as necessary.”).
26. Id. § 1(c)(i).
27. See id. § 1(c)(ii) (“[V]erify the existence of rules of conduct and training
for Federal Government personnel and contractors . . . establish policies and
procedures, or confirm that policies and procedures are in place . . . .”).
28. See id. § 1(b)(ii) (“[E]nsure that UAS activities are performed in a
manner consistent with the Constitution and applicable laws, Executive
Orders, and other Presidential directives . . . .”).
29. See id. § 1(c)(3) (“[E]stablish policies and procedures, or confirm that
policies and procedures are in place, to authorize the use of UAS in response to
a request for UAS assistance in support of Federal, State, local, tribal, or
territorial government operations . . . .”).
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privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such
funds. 30 These are relatively minor changes that do very little to
impact most drone operations, as most operations were likely
already complying with federal laws and regulations—which, as
the subsequent sections of this Essay point out, impose very few
restrictions on aerial surveillance.
On transparency, the memorandum takes measures to provide
the public with greater information about the federal government’s
use of drones. The memorandum attempts to balance privacy with
national security and law enforcement interests. It requires
agencies to provide notice to the public regarding where in the
national airspace an agency’s drones are permitted to operate. 31
Agencies must also keep the public informed of their drone
programs and any changes that would significantly affect privacy,
civil rights, or civil liberties. 32 On an annual basis, agencies must
also provide a general summary of their drone operations during
the previous fiscal year. 33 That summary must “include a brief
description of types or categories of missions flown, and the
number of times the agency provided assistance to other agencies,
or to State, local, tribal, or territorial governments.” 34
IV. The Need for Action in States and Municipalities Regarding
Data Handling Procedures
While the controversy over NSA surveillance techniques
raised questions about how the NSA gathered information about
targets (and collaterally gathered information about non-targets),
30. See id. § 1(c)(vi) (“[R]equire that State, local, tribal, and territorial
government recipients of Federal grant funding for the purchase or use of UAS
for their own operations have in place policies and procedures to safeguard
individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties prior to expending such
funds.”).
31. See id. § 1(d)(i) (“[P]rovide notice to the public regarding where the
agency’s UAS are authorized to operate in the NAS . . . .”).
32. See id. § 1(d)(ii) (“[K]eep the public informed about the agency’s UAS
program as well as changes that would significantly affect privacy, civil rights,
or civil liberties . . . .”).
33. See id. § 1(d)(iii) (“[M]ake available to the public, on an annual basis, a
general summary of the agency’s UAS operations during the previous fiscal
year . . . .”).
34. Id.
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what was also revealed were the extensive administrative
procedures governing the collection, retention, and access to stored
data. 35 As state and local governments begin to collect massive
amounts of information from drones, it raises significant questions
about whether those local governments have the same
sophisticated audit and compliance procedures that the federal
government claims it has.
Focusing merely on federal rules and federal operations
obscures a huge portion of the discussion, as state and local
operators will be the government actors most likely to use drones
in search and rescue operations and in support of law enforcement
activity, like serving a warrant or documenting a crime scene. 36
Similarly, the information gathered from a drone for law
enforcement will be stored on law enforcement computers and will
be subject to state and local laws governing the handling of
personally identifying information and information disclosure. 37
35. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (addressing said concerns
and the various sources that cover related administrative procedures).
36. Cf. MATT LEWIS, MESA CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, MSCO UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM TEAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2014),
http://sheriff.mesacounty.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=1
1383&libID=11401 (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (“We most often use [UAS] for
crime scene photography, and search and rescue missions.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); 2011–2012 FAA List of Drone License
Applicants, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/2012faa-list-drone-applicants (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (listing drone license
applicants, including various federal, state, and educational entities) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kevin Bonham, Grand Forks County
Drone Assists at Bemidji Blast Scene, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:35
PM), http://www.grandforksherald.com/news/region/3666035-grand-forks-countydrone-assists-bemidji-blast-scene (last visited June 22, 2015) (discussing how a
Grand Forks County Sheriff’s Department drone assisted in the investigation of
a gas explosion that destroyed a house) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Cyrus Farivar, San Jose Police Department Says FAA Can’t Regulate Its
Drone Use, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 6, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/08/san-jose-police-say-faa-cant-regulate-its-drone-use-faa-disagrees/
(last visited June 22, 2015) (explaining that the San Jose police want to use
drones mainly to access potential explosive devices) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Ed Pilkington, “We See Ourselves as the Vanguard”: The
Police Force Using Drones to Fight Crime, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/drones-police-force-crime-uavsnorth-dakota (last visited June 22, 2015) (detailing the ways the Grand Forks
Sheriff’s department has used their drone) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
37. See Stephen Rushin, The Legislative Response to Mass Police
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Significant law and policy issues will arise at the local level, and it
is not clear that local governments are prepared. In fact, state and
local governments will be the preeminent battleground for law and
policy debates about drones, and it appears they are far behind in
crafting rules to handle the data they are about to collect.
V. Data Retention Procedures for Drones
A. Adopt Data Retention Procedures that Require Heightened
Levels of Suspicion and Increased Procedural
Protections Over Time
Many critics of drones raise the legitimate concern that the
government’s collection of aerial imagery and video will enable
pervasive wide-area surveillance that allows the government to
know what all citizens are doing at all points in time. Such
warehousing of information may even allow government officials
to review footage years after its collection, revealing the most
intimate details about a person’s life. This is not a problem unique
to drones but is rather a recurring theme in critiques of all video
and still imagery collection. Legislators should adopt policies that
address collection and retention of information in a way that
focuses on the information that is collected, how it is stored, and
how it is accessed, rather than the particular technology used to
collect the information. Thus, while this section speaks specifically
about aerial surveillance, the principles articulated here apply to
all forms of video and imagery collection.
To protect against pervasive surveillance and warehousing of
data about citizens, legislators should enact retention policies and
procedures that make it more difficult for the government to access
information as time passes. Eventually, information collected by
Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 53–56 (2013) (discussing the data integrity,
access, and privacy of surveillance data collected by police); Corey Ciocchetti, Just
Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of Personally
Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 617 (2008) (overviewing
the laws regarding the collection of personally identifying information some
states have in place for both state and local agencies and businesses); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 11019.9 (West 2015) (mandating each state agency enact and maintain a
permanent privacy policy); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-502 (West 2014)
(requiring each government entity of the state create a privacy policy).
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the government should be destroyed at the end of a pre-determined
period of time. While the specific duration of time and processes
may be subject to debate, all procedures and timelines should be
legislatively determined, ensuring that they cannot be modified by
individual agencies. To protect the rights of individuals, the
information gathered and stored should be exempt from Sunshine
Act requests but should be fully discoverable in any criminal
prosecution. 38
A few procedural ideas are outlined below that will form the
bulk of any responsible retention procedure:
• From the moment of collection to up to thirty days after
collection, information should be treated like any other
contemporaneous or near contemporaneous observation.
Government agents should be able to monitor aerial
surveillance in real time or near real time, just as they
observe CCTV’s in real time or near real time. This
thirty-day window will allow law enforcement to respond to
immediate or nearly immediate complaints about violations
of the law.
• After thirty days have passed from initial collection,
information collected from aerial surveillance should be
moved from servers openly accessible by law enforcement
to servers that are only accessible with a court order and a
showing of reasonable suspicion.
• After ninety days have passed from initial collection, police
should not be allowed to access information stored on
servers without a court order and a showing of probable
cause that the information contained on the servers
contains evidence of a crime.
• All information stored on servers should be automatically
deleted after a period of time so that the government does
not maintain a long-term archive of information about
individuals. That period of time may be as short as 120 days
but should not be longer than five years.
38. Note that while I argue the information gathered should be exempt from
Sunshine Act requests, the transparency recommendations below contend that
the fact of collection and the government’s use of aerial surveillance technology
should be subject to transparency and accountability reforms and heightened
oversight.
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As with prior proposals, these limits are general guidelines
with inherent policy trade-offs. A jurisdiction may value law
enforcement prerogatives over privacy and may choose to place a
greater emphasis on having data accessible for longer periods of
time without a showing of cause, and consequently might move the
thirty-day limit to a sixty-day limit. That decision might enhance
the law enforcement value of aerial surveillance data, but it would
also impose a civil liberties cost. Such decisions are best calibrated
at the local level, where legislatures can gauge their particular
crime levels and their constituents’ desires for privacy. 39
B. Adopt Transparency and Accountability Measures
Transparency and accountability measures should be
required, regardless of whether legislators follow the
recommendations in this Essay or choose to follow the ill-conceived
warrant based approach. Transparency and accountability
measures may be more effective than suppression rules or
warrants for controlling and deterring wrongful government
surveillance. To hold law enforcement accountable, legislators
should mandate that the use of all aerial surveillance devices—
manned or unmanned—be published on a regular basis, perhaps
quarterly, on the website of the agency operating the system.
These usage logs should detail who operated the system, when
it was operated, where it was operated (including GPS
coordinates), and what the law enforcement purpose for the
operation was. Legislators may even mandate that unmanned
systems operated in their jurisdictions come equipped with
software that allows for the easy export of flight logs that contain
this information. Such logs will allow privacy advocates and
concerned citizens to closely monitor how aerial surveillance

39. I say “might” enhance the law enforcement value because, as the amount
of data increases, law enforcement will face challenges analyzing that data. Cf.
Sandra I. Erwin, Too Much Information, Not Enough Intelligence, NAT’L DEF.
MAG. (May 2012), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/May/
Pages/TooMuchInformation,NotEnoughIntelligence.aspx (last visited June 22,
2015) (“Intelligence experts say the military is drowning in data but not able to
convert that information into intelligible reports that break it down and analyze
it.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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devices are being used, enabling the political process as a
mechanism to hold operators accountable.
In circumstances where publishing usage logs may reveal
information that is law enforcement sensitive, such as an ongoing
investigation, the agency operating the drone may keep their usage
logs confidential until the investigation is closed. The agency
should be required to make the logs public within thirty days of the
close of an investigation. To facilitate public accountability,
legislators should mandate that all logs be published in an open
and machine-readable format consistent with the President’s
Executive Order of May 9, 2013. 40
For evidence that this flight log approach works, one need only
look across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom, where many police
departments publish their helicopter flight logs on their webpage;
in fact, some even live tweet their helicopters’ activities. 41 While
there is no law in the United Kingdom that specifically requires
police departments or law enforcement agencies to publish the
flight logs of their helicopters, their version of the Freedom of
Information Act appears to be the legislative authority prompting
publication of police helicopter logs. 42
Like the United States, there are a number of public watchdog
groups in the United Kingdom that monitor police activity,
including groups whose sole purpose is to monitor the activity—
and related noise complaints—of police helicopters. 43 These
groups, and their respective websites, act as a forum for noise and
privacy complaints from various individuals across the Kingdom,
and several of these groups organize and lobby Members of
40. See Barack Obama, Executive Order—Making Open and Machine
Readable the New Default for Government Information, WHITE HOUSE (May 9,
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/09/executive-ordermaking-open-and-machine-readable-new-default-government- (last visited Oct.
8, 2015) (providing an open data policy with directions for implementing the
policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See infra notes 43–49 and accompanying text (describing these police
departments’ programs in greater detail).
42. See, e.g., Issue of Police Helicopter Flights at Night over South
Hampstead
London
NW6
(LB
Camden),
WHATDOTHEYKNOW,
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/issue_of_police_helicopter_fligh (last
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (providing the results of a FOIA request for information
regarding certain police helicopter flights) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
43. See, e.g., id. (same).
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Parliament (MPs) to pass legislation restricting helicopter
flyovers. 44 These groups, and the advocacy that they generate,
appear to be largely responsible for the recent trend of many UK
police departments publishing their helicopters’ flight logs or
creating Twitter accounts for their helicopters that publish realtime or delayed-time updates of the aircrafts’ activity. 45
These helicopter Twitter accounts, which have become a
growing trend amongst British police departments, have had an
immediate and powerful effect on public relations in their
respective jurisdictions. In Islington, the police department went
from struggling to handle the overload of noise complaints relating
to the department’s use of its helicopter to receiving no complaints
after the creation of its Helicopter Twitter feed. 46 The Twitter
account gained over 7,000 followers within its first few weeks, and
the public criticism of police helicopter activity ceased entirely. 47
The department reflected on the effectiveness—as well as future
potential—of the Twitter feed by issuing this statement:
Maybe that is all people wanted—just to know and understand
what we were doing. We don’t update people in real time, but
my vision is that soon we will be able to let people know about
an operation as soon as it is over. In some cases we could get
them to help—imagine if an elderly person with Alzheimer’s
44. See Early Day Motion 394: Helicopter Flights over London, UK
PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2012-13/394 (last visited Feb. 25,
2015) (proposing legislation to regulate/reduce the amount of noise pollution
caused by nighttime police helicopter flyovers in London) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. Not all activity is published. The Cleveland (UK) Police Department’s
website indicates that: “This page is intended to provide basic information to the
general public regarding the work of the police helicopter and will be updated on
a daily basis. . . . Please note that not all items are always listed due to
operational sensitivity or ongoing investigation.” Helicopter Watch, CLEVELAND
POLICE, http://www.cleveland.police.uk/news/helicopter-watch.aspx (last visited
Feb. 25, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See Jon Dean, Police Helicopter Twitter Account Stops Islington
Complaints, ISLINGTON GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.islington
gazette.co.uk/news/police_helicopter_twitter_account_stops_islington_complaint
s_1_1206725 (last visited June 22, 2015) (“The Air Support Unit (ASU) say
objections from Islington residents have dropped to zero since the Gazette
published details of where and when the helicopters operated.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. See id. (“‘We have been staggered by the response to the Twitter
account—we have 7,000 followers and it has only been going a few weeks.’”).
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was missing in Islington, we could Tweet our followers to keep
an eye out. 48

The Suffolk Police Department launched its Twitter feed with
the hope of shedding some light on police practices. Roger Lewis,
an observer with the Suffolk Police, described the department’s
intentions in the following way:
We hope to use the Twitter feed to highlight the positive work
being done by the Air Operations Unit and to keep members of
the public informed as to why the helicopter has been deployed.
We hope people will enjoy finding out more about the Unit and
hopefully our tweets will give some explanation as to why we
have been deployed and give some interesting insights into a
very important policing tool. 49

It is not difficult to see how the practice of disclosing nonsensitive flight logs through a public channel—such as a
department web page or Twitter—can be a useful tool in
reassuring the public that law enforcement’s helicopter does not
represent Big Brother’s eye in the sky, but rather embodies a part
of the department’s lawful policing practices. Just as a police
helicopter high overhead can be ominous to those on the ground
who are unaware of its purposes, the very idea of drones—of any
kind—flying above American cities and towns might be foreboding
to many laypersons. By requiring law enforcement to publish data
or logs, legislators can add a citizen-centric political check that will
help quell the fears of a society that is not yet certain how it should
react to the increasing presence of aerial surveillance devices over
the skies of America.
C. Institutionalize Oversight
State and local governments may also want to create oversight
boards modeled after the federal Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board. The local board could be comprised of appointees
drawn from the community. Such a surveillance oversight board
48. Id.
49. Suffolk Police, UK’s Suffolk Police Helicopter Unit Now on Twitter,
HELIHUB (Sept. 3, 2012), http://helihub.com/2012/09/03/uks-suffolk-policehelicopter-unit-now-on-twitter/ (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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could have a cross-section of civil liberties and law enforcement
minded individuals who could conduct audits of surveillance
activities. Such audits might include reviewing data that was
collected, checking for compliance with accountability procedures,
or searching for areas where discriminatory targeting may be
occurring.
Independent oversight bodies can provide policymakers with
a transparency-oriented means to ensure accountability and
expose wrongdoing, but they may also deter wrongdoing. 50 If police
departments know that an oversight board will be auditing their
activity, it may convince them to live up to the expectations and
standards embedded in law. 51 This, of course, assumes that
policymakers want to change the status quo, but the amount of
drone-related legislation being proposed in various jurisdictions
suggests that legislators are in fact interested in making
changes. 52 Moreover, the intense public interest in the issue
suggests that there are many incentives for elected officials to
exercise greater oversight of drone surveillance, as there is
substantial interest group advocacy associated with the topic.
While legislators may have interest in the topic, they may not have
the time or resources to exercise intense oversight. A dedicated
oversight board could specialize in overseeing surveillance
activities.
There are good reasons to believe that independent oversight
of surveillance might be quite successful. 53 As legal scholars Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule have pointed out, independent
commissions can be established to review policies before and after
50. For a lengthier discussion of accountability, see generally Gregory S.
McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681 (2014).
51. See ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 14 (2001)
(discussing deterrence).
52. For a discussion of the status quo, see Gregory S. McNeal, Preventative
Detention: The Status Quo Bias and Counterterrorism Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 855, 882–83 (2012) (describing the status quo bias in
policymaking); cf. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING & POLICY CHANGE:
WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 43 (2009) (“Even if policy makers recognize that
the policy is imperfect or the result of an error, . . . it may still be a hard sell to
convince others, especially those in leadership positions, that the current policy
is working so badly that it must be overhauled.”).
53. Cf. McNeal, supra note 50, at 785–93 (discussing plausible accountability
reforms that could enhance the accountability of the targeted killing process).
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the fact, and politicians might gain credibility by binding
themselves to give the commissions authority along various
dimensions. 54 Policymakers might promise to follow the
recommendations of a commission and give power to a commission
to review the success of policy choices related to drones. 55
Independent oversight boards can be successful because they
signal the interests of politicians in maintaining credibility and
winning the support of the public, and a willingness to make
information available that could subject the government to
criticism. 56 Independent oversight boards allow politicians to claim
that they are holding law enforcement accountable, while at the
same time shifting the blame for poor accountability decisions to
others—ensuring that politicians can exercise oversight without
needing to fear blowback from powerful law enforcement unions. 57
The first challenge associated with such an approach is to
ensure that police departments provide surveillance information
to the oversight board, which requires the board to be empowered
by law. Second, for an oversight board to be successful from the
outset, it will require political support. A failure on the part of
politicians to empower an oversight board may engender political
fallout for the policymakers who established the oversight board,
but only if the commissioners have a means to communicate their
lack of empowerment. The board, once appointed, may operate as
independent investigators who will have an interest in ensuring
that they are not stonewalled. Because these members will be
appointed by politicians with their own agendas, however, or the
board members themselves may have political ambition, the
54. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 141 (2010) (discussing independent
commissions).
55. See id. (same).
56. Cf. McNeal, supra note 50, at 787 (discussing how reporting
requirements for certain information could encourage civilian protection).
57. For a discussion of the power of law enforcement unions, see generally
HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM: POWER AND IMPACT IN
PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING (1973); David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s
Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006); Michael Tracey, The Pernicious Power
of the Police Lobby, VICE (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.vice.com/read/the-perniciouspower-of-police-unions (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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individuals chosen may have reason to avoid exposing abusive
surveillance practices that might create political enemies amongst
law enforcement. That reality may temper the success of an
independent oversight board, but these challenges are inherent in
any form of oversight—for example, local elected judges who
approve warrant applications are not immune from these
influences.
D. Use Technology as a Way to Protect Privacy, Not Merely Gather
Data
Perhaps the biggest problem with a warrant requirement is
that it fails to recognize that, someday, surveillance from
unmanned aircraft may be more protective of privacy than manned
surveillance. Technology continues to evolve at such a rapid pace
that it is possible drones and other aerial surveillance technologies
may enable targeted surveillance that protects collateral privacy
harms, while still allowing for the collection of evidence.
Technology can further the goal of privacy by using geofencing to
only collect evidence from specific locations and using redaction
programming to automatically obscure information—such as
faces—at the point of collection. 58 Creative policymakers can
embrace technology by writing laws requiring that aerial
surveillance devices have systems to protect privacy.
For example, imagine that the police receive a tip about
marijuana growing in the backyard of 123 Main Street. They
dispatch a helicopter to gather aerial photographs of the 123 Main
Street property from an altitude of 700 feet. While the police are
overhead photographing 123 Main Street, they look down and see
a woman sunbathing in the adjacent property at 125 Main Street.
While the inadvertent observation of the woman at 125 Main
Street does not violate her Fourth Amendment rights, it will likely
be viewed from her perspective as an offensive intrusion that
58. Cf. What is Geofencing?, TECHOPEDIA [hereinafter Geofencing],
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/14937/geofencing (last visited Feb. 25,
2015) (“Geofencing is a technology that defines a virtual boundary around a realworld geographical area. In doing so, a radius of interest is established that can
trigger an action in a geo-enabled phone or other portable electronic device.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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violates her personal expectation of privacy—even if it is not one
that society, per Supreme Court jurisprudence, is willing to deem
reasonable. But now imagine the same collection scenario, this
time conducted by a drone or a camera on a manned helicopter with
software that is programmed to protect privacy. Prior to the
mission, the aircraft would be instructed to only document the
activities ongoing at 123 Main Street. The software could be
required to automatically redact any additional information
gathered from adjoining properties—such as 125 Main Street, the
home of our hypothetical sunbather. 59 Furthermore, legislators
could also require that software automatically redact the faces of
individuals. 60
The redaction could be removed at a later date, perhaps after
a showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause (the particular
standard to be determined by the legislature) to believe that the
auto-redacted person’s face is important because they are or were
involved in criminal activity. If a state or local government
required that aircraft engaged in aerial surveillance be coded for
privacy, the rights of the adjacent sunbather and any other
inadvertently observed individuals would be protected. If such
policies were imposed, society may evolve to the point where
drones are mandated when manned flights might place law
enforcement officers in a situation where they could be tempted to
make unwanted observations of innocent people. Warrant

59. Cf. id. (defining geofencing and its capabilities); Chris Hackett & Michael
Grosinger, The Growth of Geofence Tools Within the Mapping Technology Sphere,
PDVWIRELESS
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.pdvwireless.com/the-growth-ofgeofence-tools-within-the-mapping-technology-sphere/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015)
(“Geofencing also represents a critical element within telematics hardware and
software. It allows system users to draw zones around places of work, customer
sites and secure areas.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See 2seas uav, 3i Movie, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2014), https://youtube/
wHQnpfgvK1o (describing the capabilities of “smart surveillance” technologies);
Eric Pfeiffer, How a Seattle Programmer Used Public Records Laws to Push Police
to Fix a Surveillance Video Tech Headache, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://www.govexec.com/state-local/2015/01/seattle-police-camera-video-redact
ion/102483/ (last visited June 22, 2015) (“We can use a software program to
transcribe and remove audio. It would really deal with the privacy issues. I wrote
a simple script that looks for and is able to properly remove the personal
information exactly how they do it by hand. It’s very precise.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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requirements do little to allow this type of privacy protective
technology to develop; they merely act as a soft ban on drones.
VI. Conclusion
This Essay argues that state and local governments will need
to address data retention issues related to drones. It argues that
governments should enact laws mandating data retention
procedures that require heightened levels of suspicion and
increased procedural protections for accessing stored data
gathered by aerial surveillance, coupled with a requirement that
data be deleted after a legislatively mandated period of time. 61
Second, governments should impose enhanced transparency and
accountability measures, requiring agencies to publish
information about the use of aerial surveillance devices—both
manned and unmanned—on a regular basis and should consider
creating local oversight boards to police the use of surveillance
technologies. 62 Third, cities should institutionalize oversight and
auditing procedures. 63 Fourth, legal reformers should recognize
that technology such as auto-redaction may make aerial
surveillance by drones more protective of privacy than human
surveillance. 64

61. See supra Part V.A (setting forth this argument).
62. See supra Part V.B (outlining these methods of achieving transparency
and accountability).
63. See supra Part V.C (advising municipalities on this matter).
64. See supra Part V.D (describing how technology could work to actually
protect citizens’ privacy).

